The Medusa’s jamming ability is only really useful against ground units. When an aircraft is jammed, units can still be selected and locked on to, because the sensors are optical and the aircraft’s datalink connection is apparently not affected by the jamming. I think that when being jammed:
1. An aircraft’s datalink connection should be disabled. It should retain full use of its optical sensors, but shouldn’t be able to receive information from or transmit information to the team datalink. This includes unit detection, unit destruction, and nuclear exclusion zones. This should only work when the Medusa is <20 km from the aircraft it is jamming. If possible, a reliability mechanic should be implemented so that these effects are unpredictable, for instance an aircraft’s connection could fail intermittently before failing completely. There should be a visible warning to indicate datalink disconnection.
2. A jammed aircraft’s radar should stop working when the jamming Medusa is <10 km from the aircraft. This too should be intermittent at first, with momentary failures and gradual range reduction, and also “hallucinations” of units and radar pings, then fail completely when the jamming Medusa is <5km away. This would prevent the detection of enemy radar acquisitions, and therefore the missile launch warnings and evasion assistance systems. This would also prevent tracking of aircraft beyond the range of the aircraft’s optical sensors.
Optional long-range camera pods could be equipped to deal with some of these effects. Obviously none of these effects should apply to ARAD missiles as they have their own radar. The radar should only lose function if the Medusa is at an appropriate angle: if there is a metal plane between the radar receiver and the source the jammer, radar function should be maintained. This aims to increase the utility of an otherwise useless aircraft in air-to-air combat. Thanks for coming to my Ted Talk!

