[PASSED]Governance V2 Updated Version

[pastel mulch]

Gov V2 is a work in progress. We acknowledge that this proposal, as written, is not complete. There are still topics in this proposal that are in contention within the council. We expect many of those to be identified by the community as well, and look forward to discussions. We will need to incorporate additional legal guidance into this proposal as well.

This is being posted now to give the community time to review and parse the document. We want to start incorporating community feedback into future revisions. There is a LOT of content in Gov V2, and it will take some time to understand and internalize how everything functions.

v 0.2 - https://docs.google.com/document/d/1qKB1fy7Z1CcF1nFxAgGnCoKu-YFFCEdW_r_kUlnJr-g/edit?usp=sharing

The council has been working to implement community feedback and create a more decentralized structure within Gov V2. Many of the changes in V0.2 were modifications for clarity, but a few more substantial changes were added as well. In an effort to increase clarity, any changes or re-ordering from V0.1 to V0.2 are displayed in blue text. Comments have been added to all changed or moved sections, to provide a faster way to navigate to changed sections and serve as a pseudo change-log.
Major Changes:
Vote of No Confidence (Appendix A4)
Emergency Proposal Process (Appendix A6)
Change from a 3/2 structure for sub-councils to a 4/1 structure (i.e. 4 community members, 1 team member).

We do want community feedback on these structures, and any other feedback the community wishes to provide. We'll reiterate that Gov V2 is a living document, there are some inconsistencies in the current draft, most of which we are aware of and are actively under discussion. Please contribute any thoughts you may have on these areas. Additional changes may be required to ensure the structure of the DAO is consistent with a decentralized ethos for Governance, so bear with us as we receive additional guidance in this area and implement changes accordingly.

We'd like to acknowledge Scrubadubdad, who provided some excellent feedback on V0.1, including revisions for clarity and readability. Much of that feedback has been integrated into V0.2, including the defintions section and the removal of redundant sections of the original proposal.

||Old Version: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1eogzXLAbUNyYDJK0OqIJn_bkoZWRo8mM_isGWsxjcw0/edit?usp=sharing||

<@&814435151307866142>

[glad vigil]

I wasn't at the Town Hall so I don't want to comment on anything before I listen to that. But there was a few things I noticed while reading that might be an easy fix:

• after "Recommended Qualifications" in the Game and Strategy Sub-Council there is nothing at the moment, maybe we can add an asterisk that this still need to be updated?
• Organigram image is now wrong after the changes, also here we can add some sort of asterisk that this is not up to date yet and should be updated soon

[fickle mauve]

I'll add a note to the Organigram, but there should be a visible comment on the sub-council roles.

[glad vigil]

Hopefully I'm not fully wrong, but I don't think anyone who doesn't have the access can see the comments.

Little bit of Google and it's says: "At this time, only people with edit or comment access can see comments. There isn't any way to allow those with view access to see comments, as view access allows only a view of the document itself and not anything outside the document (which is where comments are located)."

[fickle mauve]

That's news to me, good feedback. We'll see if we can implement something better for the next revision. There are certainly some inconsistencies in the document we're aware of, including the Organigram not aligning with the 4/1 structure, and Qualifications not being fully fleshed out. Both of these items are on a list of revisions we intend to make, and we ARE looking for feedback on qualifications/experience.

[spare meteor]

Thanks for your feedback @glad vigil . Your comments definitely went into the addition of the emergency proposal process, so I'd love to hear your feedback there as well when you have time. (I also know the flow chart has a typo and needs cleaned up a bit - this was my 80-for-20 attempt at getting a process out there for people to react to)

[eager glacier]

Thank you guys for recording the town hall. I just listened to it now, and it was a nice brief overview of some new topics in the new document. I will try and read it this weekend, appreciate it guys!

[feral notch]

Small note I would add something like : “All voting will occur simultaneously, to maximize $ILV staker turnout and reduce administrative burden” It’s important in general to hold fewer elections to reduce voter fatigue.

[glad vigil]

There is more about voting process on page 17.

There is also this: "...Then on day 25 the voting period would begin. On day 30 the voting would be completed...."

But I agree with you that adding that sentence will only help the document.

[glad vigil]

While we are waiting for the updated Organigram from the team, hopefully this can help visual somewhat the changed structure that is currently proposed in v 0.2.

[pastel mulch]

I still think maybe everyone is elected from same pool, team members would have no issues making a council imo

[feral notch]

cap team at 1 in each subby?

[fickle mauve]

In that vein, a written summary of the options:

1. 4/1, Community and Team elected separately (i.e. guaranteed 1 team member seat). A separate category exists for the team seat and the community seats, so as long as at least 1 team member runs, we have a team member on the sub-council.

2. 4/1, Community and Team elected together (i.e. no guarantee of team member seat). It's likely a team member would get elected, but in the event they didn't, this scenario is not great. Team interaction within sub-councils is going to be critical. This also requires a cap on the number of team members who can be elected, if we do want to limit sub-councils to a single team member.

3. 4/1, Community Elected, Team member appointed. The team chooses someone who has time and is willing to participate in governance.

I've definitely been more in favour of option 3, as it reduces election overhead, but my close 2nd choice would be option 1. The main challenge is that our Snapshot votes would be SUPER messy (8 separate elections + potentially a Team Admin election). Option 2 is fine, but it's not very robust and doesn't guarantee the outcome we really want, which is 100% of the time, a single team member on each sub-council.

There's some hybrid options as well, things like "the most voted team member always gets a team seat" as an addition to option 2, or an addition to option 3 where the team conducts an internal election for the team member on each sub-council. I'm wary of the added complexity with these hybrid options, we get into a bunch of messy edge cases pretty fast with complicated systems.

[feral notch]

That a figjam?

[spare meteor]

This also further speaks to the need of ranked choice voting. My preference is for #1 and personally, I would exclude #2 due to the potential negative outcome of not having a team member represented, which undoes a lot of the other intent, particularly around technical vetting of ideas. I believe team feedback is critical here to understand how many are interested and are able to commit the time for each subcouncil. Understanding if there will be one person interested or twenty interested team members may also help shape the initial rollout of the gov v2 voting model.

[pastel mulch]

I just dont see a situation where a team member would not make it if running

speaking to some community members last night, they were saying they just vote for whoever the team member is because they trust them as the expert in the know

[feral notch]

Are you suggesting not having a requirement? Just have an agreement with Illuvium Labs that a team member will run for each sub-council.

[fickle mauve]

If this is the case, it's added incentive (in my mind) to just appoint the team member. As we've (mostly) identified in Gov V1, a team member on council is mandatory. I'd be concerned that the mandatory team vote could detract from a more critical assessment of the community nominees. We can at least separate the categories so that there's fair contest for votes. I'd still advise that a team member is absolutely mandatory, and by extension, we should separate mandatory voting from voting by preference.

[spare meteor]

that presents the challenge. we need strong community representations, and need everyone's perspective on who is the most valuable community members to serve. Just selecting the team member doesn't help ensure everyone's perspective of what makes a good community representative is heard

[pastel mulch]

I'm just saying if the concern was that a team member wouldnt make it, i just dont think thats the case

and in the spirit of the most decentralised model possible, appointing team members I'm not sure covers that

but maybe I'm wrong and majority being voted is still 'decentralised enough'

[feral notch]

That was my concern, what is the optics of an appointed member? Could they be advisory only?
But I also feel like 4/5 being community voted makes it 'decentralized enough'

[fickle mauve]

In terms of practical outcomes, I do think we need to guarantee a team member sits on each council, just from a "Let's make sure this is a functional structure" perspective. At a minimum, I think choosing solutions that guarantee this criteria is met is essential. I don't believe the current council could function effectively without a direct link to the team, we'd be flying blind. I believe this will extend into the Gov V2 structure as well.

In terms of opinion, I see additional value in terms of those team members having a voice in decisions. I'd personally be less engaged in council duties if my role were advisory. I see additional value added by a team member providing rationale for their voting, as a point of comparison between what we'll call the "team" interpretation of proposals as compared to the community interpretation, and seeing how those perspectives align or diverge.

Beyond guaranteeing a team member is on each sub-council, I'd be relatively happy with either an elected or appointed model, but I don't see a major difference in decentralization between the two. Ultimately, the team member is still a part of the team whether they are elected or appointed, and so I've been more favorable of the solution with less complexity (appointment).

If we want to take another step towards maximum decentralization, it would involve a 5/1 structure with the team member in an advisory capacity, but I think we'd lose something valuable by taking that step.

[spare meteor]

The 4/1 versus 2/1 or 3/2 (community/team) distributions also greatly help the decentralization argument. For simplicity in the conversion to gov v2 and ensuring good engagement in the election, I would support the appointment model for the sub-council representatives. While certain team members have a strong community presence, the team also knows best who can fulfill the functions requested of each of the sub-councils.

[spare meteor]

my preference is for the team to have a vote, potentially more importantly to require them to both vote and post their rationale for voting a certain direction. I believe it is critical for the community to hear the team's perspective in decision making, particularly if the team representative is opposed to the community elected members.

[glad vigil]

As Governance structure is one of the biggest changes in the v 0.2. I would like to ask a couple of question on that topic, they don't need answering, but maybe I'll encourage some more thinking and ideas about the structure.

In the current proposed structure we are looking for 17 $ILV holders that want to participate in the governance, where 12 of them should have a solid background in a specific field. In the last election there was 23 people nominated, election before that 18 nominees. Are we ready to take that next step? Because we don't need just 17 people that are willing to be on a council. We need 17 dedicated council members like we have now for example, and 12 of that 17 should have some experience and background in a specific field.

To continue the topic from above, I agree with Deraji when he says that "4/1 versus 2/1 or 3/2 (community/team) distributions also greatly help the decentralization argument" and I agree that 1 team member in the sub-council should be voted in by the team or just appointed. But what nobody is mentioning - I don't know why we can't have two team members in the sub-council if the voters want that. Let's say that 1 is a must and is appointed by the team, but somebody else that is interested can also nominate themself and be chosen by the voters to also be on a council. But I would stop there with the point that "no more then one team member can be voted in by the holders".

What I also don't understand and there was a talk of that before is why we need to have 5 members in the Community Sub-Council. I think that 3 people in that Sub-Council is more then enough. But maybe there is more to that Sub-Council that I don't understand and 5 people are definitely needed.

My proposed structures:
I guess 2/1 Sub-Councils are a no go and that it was discussed before so I won't be mentioning that. But in my opinion, I'm not sure we can find 3x4 interested individuals atm with experience in the specific fields to be on the Sub-Councils.

But I'm proposing the change where holders can vote in another team member as well and a change to Community Sub-Council. Where either we get that down to 3 members or we just take 1 member of other Sub-Council and appoint them an extra duty. (other members would also have duties like writing notes during meeting etc.)

[spare meteor]

Great questions, and its definitely things we've been talking about. I appreciate the conversation continuing here, and I'll just add a little context of some of these points. Overall, the biggest goal is decentralization, and frankly, the easiest way to outwardly demonstrate decentralization is with more people. Now the question comes to your point, are there enough qualified interested people to take on all these spots? I honestly believe there are. My rationale for that is that is how the subcouncils have been defined. There are certain individuals that wouldn't run currently because of the expertise and work needed from the current council, but would be incredibly interested in a specialized position. Volkin is a perfect example. I'm certain he would be interested in joining the council again under the Game specialization. Marketing is broadly defined, and the DAO likely will want to engage social media experts and those with experience in other areas, such as event planning and broad public marketing. Community definitely has a number of passionate individuals interested in that capacity. We can start to take a survey, but I believe I could name a full list of qualified an interested individuals to take on these spots.

As for whether there should be more team members, that gets into the optics of decentralization, as has been stated above. Team members likely have a community bias as experts, and if multiple individuals run in the general community election, there is a high likelihood they win. We need to determine if we limit that in other ways. Is there a maximum of 2 team members who can win? Is there one appointed team member and then others can run, and if they win, they get in? Is only the team member with the most votes in, and then it's the top three community members? It adds a lot of complexity, and runs the risk of not getting a strong sense of who the best community members are for the remaining spots. Its certainly something to continue debating as team members absolutely would have a lot to add to every position. Its just a question of whether that is the best thing in terms of decentralizing decision making.

[spare meteor]

As for reducing the community council to 3 spots, there is likely a LOT of work for that subcouncil to initially vet and build out all proposals. Five members gives a stronger division of labor there, and that's probably the least concerning subcouncil to get interested individuals.

Of course, these are just my thoughts and I'm totally open to discuss all of these further.

[glad vigil]

I agree that community sub-council is the one that will have the most interested individuals. But only that is not the reason we need 5 people there. But the truth is, you (and other council members now and before) for sure know better then me how much work they will have. From the outside, to me at least, it seems like there isn’t enough duties for 5 people, but I’m happy to be wrong.

On the topic of ‘is there going to be enough interested individuals’ I mainly agree with you. Of course we are going to feel all the spots. That for sure isn’t the problem. But I would want to avoid that we only have like 5-6 people nominated for one category. Or for the people to be “fishing” spots on the council, where they wait for the last couple of hours and nominate themselves in the sub-council with the least nominees. I agree that with specific sub-council that should be hard to do because you need some background. But, in my eyes, it would be a bad look for Illuvium to have people “fishing” for spots in the sub-council with not a lot of nominees.

But in the end, I agree with you and I do think that we’ll have more interested people in the running and enough people with great backgrounds in every sub-council. I was just asking questions that I haven’t seen before as I think that looking it from every angle can only help structure the Governance.

[spare meteor]

I was actually hoping we would have been able to share a draft of this before the last election, and have one of TSG's interview questions be "if gov v2 was enacted today, which sub council would you like to run for?" That would have been a quick test of those already interested in running how the distribution would fall. Potentially we can do a survey during the current epoch to see how it goes. Personally, I'd go for Strategy.

[glad vigil]

Also I wanted to add on the topic how team members have the community bias and therefore we might not get the best community members for the remaining spots.

That is for sure one downside of being able to vote for only one person. But I still don’t 100% agree with that. If the voters want another team member added to the council why is that not ‘decentalized way’?

Also, to you point, if we have a community member with the best expertise for a certain sub-council, better then anyone else, does that also add to the risk of not electing the best 4 members because almost everyone will vote for the best candidate?
Also, we saw the similar situation in the last election. Team member with community bias got a third of the votes. Do you think that because of that we didn’t get the best council we could? Because I don’t.

And last point, having a survey would be helpful for sure, even thought it wouldn’t paint the full picture in my opinion.

[spare meteor]

This is where we need to switch from single choice voting. Switching to blind voting last time was very helpful. We need to see where Snapshot is at from a technology side to see if they can support the ranked choice/multiple choice voting that we need for our system. it's also been discussed to develop our own system internally, but that will take resources. We will get there one way or the other to overcome the limitations of single choice voting.

[spare meteor]

as for the survey, agreed, its not the full picture, but it may highlight if we have an unexpected problem. I'm a big fan of surveys (as I use them a lot in my day job). Particularly when people care about the results and the data set is big enough, you get some pretty good direction from them.

[fickle mauve]

Speaking anecdotally, I've engaged with no less than 7-8 people in voice chat alone who are interested in running for a sub-council and didn't run in a prior election. It's possible the limited number of council seats was a limiting factor for people in the past, or perhaps that potential nominees felt their particular skill set wasn't a high priority for the epoch. With the addition of the game sub-council and the community sub-council, I feel those councils will be filled easily.

I do share some amount of your concern that any one of the sub-councils could end up with an insufficient workload. That's a possibility that hasn't been ruled out. I do anticipate situations arising where sub-councils need to be creative and find additional ways to add value to the DAO, but those aren't necessarily situations that should be looked at as a burden. Having 5 members on a sub-council, all of whom are reasonably knowledgable in their areas of expertise, there could easily be ways to add value that this council has not identified. I personally think the community and/or game sub-councils are the sub-councils most likely have a large workload (by volume), as sub-councils iron out processes, but that is just my opinion.

My personal vision for the community sub-council is that they would take on the brunt of community to IMC communication, and potentially advise other sub-councils on community sentiment across various media, including Discord, Twitter etc. Additionally, they could focus on explicit community consultation (town halls, video content etc.), and perhaps most importantly, helping bring proposals from ideation to IIP format. I don't view any of those tasks or general roles as trivial or easy (communication related tasks tend to take a lot of time and diligence), and it would seem hasty to short the community sub-council in particular.

With all that said, this structure will almost certainly need revision once it's been seen in action. Tweaks to the number of members on each sub-council are certainly possible based on the actual workload each sub-council is dealing with, and the efficacy of each sub-council in the eyes of the community.

[feral notch]

I wonder if there is anything we can incorporate in v2 to make it more of a “beta” version that could be easily modified. One thought I had was keep the structure as is for now but create them as working-groups that evolve to full sub councils once a permanent need is demonstrated. Major changes I see for possible mix ups would be strategic or game needing to be sub-divided. Or marketing not having enough workload and being absorbed into another group.

Perhaps the first iteration maybe v1.5 could be a trial and error period where the people elected are also tasked with feeling out the new structure.

[spare meteor]

i'd say we've been in a continual beta version of governance. As we move to v2, everything will be adjustable, and even if there aren't changes mid-epoch, it's at most a 6 month test with the structure. We certainly will get feedback on division of work and can adjust or assign other tasks (e.g. develop additional onboarding materials) if council members don't have enough to do. Having the election and ensuring commitment from the first wave of v2 to really identify key issues. Lastly, I feel it's important for governance to actually lead the way and be ahead of where we are as a DAO (have the structure and not need it compared to needing the structure and not having it). Presuming it takes this full epoch to get to gov v2, next one could be very busy for all four subcouncils based on what's expected for 2023.

[scarlet creek]

This is a small thing for me but i don't see why core contributors should not be paid for additional responsibilities. They were hired/are paid for the work they do. If you add more responsibilities and work hours then they should be compensated properly for it. If they want to reject the payment out of good will then that is great and dandy but we should not be asking more out of them than anyone would want their own boss to ask of them for what they are paid. Not to say that it has to be the same pay as other council members but some additional compensation is at a minimum appropriate.

[spare meteor]

honestly, it's partially cost savings for now. the hope is the council responsibilities are melded into team member's role during their term. Its a tough balance right now of ensuring the DAO attracts good talent, compensation is sufficient to ensure engagement, and it's not too much of a financial burden. Hopefully the broader market rebounds and council pay becomes an even smaller proportion of the treasury over time. Council pay has been very hotly debated in the past, and there's no reason not to expect that to continue.

[scarlet creek]

I certainly understand the hot topic that is runway but regardless, the essence here is "if" they are burdened even more than they already are, that it needs to be taken into consideration. Whether it's an upfront payment or deferred to a year end bonus hopefully after revenue is running. Just basic consideration for our faithful hardworking team members. @spare meteor

[feral notch]

I think this is another reason for it to be assigned role instead of community vote. Kieran has said “let me” make sure they have the ability to fulfill both team work and council work.

[compact sail]

100% CC council spots should be decided internally by the team: makes sure it fits the context of their workload, but also avoids in-house politics

[feral notch]

Yes if CC on sub council can’t get info sub council needs (or say gets fired). Defeats the purpose of the spot.

[whole widget]

Epic work <@&814435151307866142>

[iron apex]

B0tch has created an updated organigram. It'll go a long way

[iron apex]

Blickter echoes my sentiment here. It's important to me that the team member is a part of the council in as higher capacity as possible so then they are deeply involved. This will make governance perform better than it ever has before without a doubt.

At the same time I'm pretty adamantly against appointed team members. We want to get to a point where the DAO has full autonomy and no external body would be able to argue otherwise.

The question then becomes to me is what's the best way to hold the elections that is fair for all. Since I agree that having a team member is essential guaranteeing their election is valuable but Ideally it's either 2 separate votes for community and team OR the highest voted team member is elected then others are ignored in favour of community. The correct answer is unclesr

[iron apex]

Its not necessarily a good reason but it's worth noting that with the significant adjustment in pay and the risk not really being divided. The role would be more misaligned to the $1500 stipend on a 3 person community council than a 5 person. They are also the gatekeeper for all the other councils and the starting point for proposals. I'd argue they need 5 members more than the other sub councils.

[glad vigil]

Why isn’t it shared anywhere then?

On a topic of voting in team members as well. I don’t think we need that. I wouldn’t like to see them in the same pool as other nominees and I wouldn’t want to vote 8 times. I don’t know what the best solution there if we want to keep the full full decentralised autonomy.

I also agree that we don’t need to wait 6 months to make the document perfect as we will never be able to do that. But making Gov v2 live will for sure make us learn a lot for the future and make the changes needed.

[iron apex]

Cause that's my fault and I let everyone down on that one

[iron apex]

Agreed

[iron apex]

On that note tho I do want to use it to build more organigrams for other parts of the document. If u can think of anything let me know

[gusty warren]

I feel that things got muddled as to the core purpose of having a team member in the specialized sub-councils.

In essence, they are there to ensure that (1) Sub-council is properly informed of any limitations an IIP has in relation to the team's capacity, bandwidth, and/or technology; and (2) the team's side or position is also heard and weighed. Thats expertise and representation.

Pushing the agenda of decentralization to justify "election" is folly because itll cause hierarchal issues within the department or even ILV labs. As an elected position, the CC is now representing him/her self and the DAO when in truth they are there to represent the Team.

At the same time, the DAO has to ensure that the CC placed in the sub-council needs to be someone holding a high position to be effective. If a CC who is not a Head or Lead position is "elected" any information they share needs to be cleared by their line manager. Now whether it be the Lead or Head who can handle that position, the best person or entity to decide that is not the DAO (who has no idea whats going internally) but the CEO/Team Admins who has management oversight.

If the issue is about filtering information, thats where NDA comes into play. This is supposed to ensure that everything shared is kept with utmost confidentiality, thus, freely shared.

Lastly, the mere fact that 4 of the SC positions are elected sufficiently supports the position of decentralization. Any decision will always have majority votes coming from the community by at least 2 elected community member.

P.S. This also makes elections simpler than holding two separate ones for community and team.

[iron apex]

Very well said. I can agree with this

[gusty warren]

Here are my thoughts on the Gov v2 (as revised)

1. Appointed not elected
I went into detail why we should not go down the route of electing the team members here: #1063212194394812507 message

To summarize:

• CC’s are there to provide insights and represent the team not themselves personally;
• DAO needs to place a requirement that the position should be filled/appointed by a CC of higher position such as a Lead or Head;
• NDA’s are there to ensure information is kept confidential and therefore can be shared freely;
• 4 out of 5 are elected from the community which makes any vote or decision inherently decentralized as majority vote will come from the community;
• Easier to conduct elections without having to type: Community and Team

2. Allow proposals from everyone
There shouldn’t be a barrier for anyone from the community (ILV holder or otherwise) to propose an idea or IIP. As the game goes mainstream we will be onboarding millions and currently we only have over 31K ILV holders. We already gatekeep or filter out bad ideas with the structure of Gov v2. Every idea has the potential to be rejected by 3 groups. (1) Community (2) Sub Council; and ultimately (3) IMC.

We have the process in place to ensure a bad IIP will not be passed. Lets trust that process.

3. Immediate Community Council Action on Proposals
We should revise the wording here to make it clear that any proposal that reaches the minimum threshold of community support will be acted on by the Community Council and does not have to wait for the 14 day period to lapse. At the same time, we should revisit the time period for when an idea or proposal needs to be “closed” down and re-proposed. 14 days maybe too early to try and garner support by the proposer/author.

4. Nomination Process (minor comment)
Remove no. 8 since its optional. Lets keep the list to what are the minimum requirements to make it simpler. Anything above and beyond should be part of the campaign period anyway.

5. Vote of No Confidence
This is definitely a step in the right direction but unfortunately, theres no proper guide or metric which would give rise to the motion. We can be broad here but still need to outline it.

Ex. Gross negligence, Habitual Absence, Violation of the Code of Ethics, Abandonment of Duty, etc.

You need to anchor any incident to a laundry list to ensure that (1) They are not frivolous; and (2) There is a threshold in terms of gravity.

Id like to get ILV’s HR to provide insights on this if possible.

6. Emergency Proposal Process
Minor: “shall render the eDAO inactive” does this mean it can be activated in a future time? Or the intention is to abolish or redundiate?

A verbal vote may be taken in the interim to enable the technical implementation of the solution/remediation with greater urgency, which is to be followed by a formal electronic vote. – Suggest to allow written vote to capture both Discord or messaging app like Telegram.

Flow chart process:
Seems like there a lot of notifications by either the CC or the Community Member. In cases like this, you’d want to lessen the burden on the one reporting/whistleblower. We can even incorporate discord channels for this and just tag the GCM and IMC. It would then be the GCM who has the responsibility to convene the necessary parties in accordance to the issue being dealt with.

Id also recommend, a framework later for crisis management that flags issues based on gravity. Ex. Yellow, Orange, Red tagged issues. That way, there is also a filtering system for EPP.

[thin kernel]

I Believe it is best to have the team members chosen by the studio admin team itself to help stop a headache. As scrubadubdad mentioned, it is a clear communication pathway to help give insight of what is capable, rather than just saying things based on assumption - great direct source of information for "behind the scenes" WIP's by illuvilabs
I am sure the admin would pick the most capable candidates - wouldn't want a marketing member accidently put in the game council, would seem a wasted talent considering we are looking for people to have a strong background in the SC's they would be in.

With the Wages, I think an extra $1500 is too steep for the nominated IMC members unless we know those members would be doing double the work of the SC. Thoughts to make it $1000 instead? The extra $500 that would of been allocated could be used to fund giveaway's for the people?? - Random thought i know but believe that there should be a set amount put aside for these types of things rather than admin consistently giving away their own goods - E.g if merch is given the $$ amount equivalent would be deducted from the "giveaway" fund for that month

With the proposal process (non emergency).. i think there should be a deadline on how long a proposal can be stagnant once it has passed the community vote. 3-4 weeks i believe is plenty of time to pass through 2 other parties considering they all are still linked to one another. I say this as i feel there is a history of delayed proposals - Just feel with soooo many members in the subs being proposed atm, it could prolong debates delaying processes - deadlines help shorten debates that could go on forever.
If there is a moment where more research is needed or a time delay with foreseen circumstances: green, orange, red flagging system could work well - orange flag should have noted comments for not making the deadline, helping the council communicate this to the community

[fickle mauve]

1. Agree.
2. Agree, and I think the current wording is a result of miscommunication on our part. The idea behind the wording "Proposals may be initiated by any ILV Holder or Staker" was that we believed formal proposals would be posted in the Governance section of Discord, which is limited to ILV Holders/Stakers (read only for anyone else). It currently looks like we may be considering that proposals would be initiated by anyone in #1020759212172775464 , and moved to #1024051771624136774 for further discussion after passing sentiment voting.

Regardless, I agree with the core of your idea - Anyone should be able to put forward a proposal, and this is an area we're actively revising and making more clear.

3. I agree that we should make it clear that upon meeting the threshold for community support, the Community Council may move a proposal to a vote. I'm of the opinion that the decision to move to Community Council voting should be the responsibility of the originator of the proposal. Being extremely explicit that a proposal MUST go to a vote after sentiment thresholds are met could cause issues where additional revisions are desired by the originator to incorporate feedback.

I still feel 14 days is a reasonable amount of time for a proposal to be considered active and open for sentiment voting. There's no rule stating that a new, similar proposal can't be started at a later time. The general idea here is to avoid having old proposals meet sentiment criteria substantially after they were originally proposed, when such proposals may no longer be relevant or desirable. This period could be changed to a month, but 30 days is a year in this space, especially when we're considering that the metric for the threshold is currently emoji reactions to proposals.

4. As someone who has an aversion to creating video content, I still understand the power of such content to share a message with a wider portion of the community. We want both the nomination process and process for voters to get informed to be highly accessible. The addition of optional video content is to explicitly make it clear that attaching a video to a nomination is a recommended tool to share your skillset in an easily digestable format. At the same time, people who are not comfortable or willing to create a video should still be able to apply.

[fickle mauve]

5. We can be a bit more explicit, but I do want to keep this broad. Specific examples of measurable failures exist in the current document, and are representative of some of the most common criticisms of council members: "including voting history, meeting attendance, comments made by the accused council member not in line with the Illuvium code of ethics and any other evidence indicative of a council member’s failure to fulfill their expectations."

I believe that the ability for the community to initiate a Vote of No Confidence genuinely handles concerns you may have around thresholds. Avoiding frivolous Votes of No Confidence is desirable, but ultimately this process has to pass 2 stages of community review. Part of being a DAO means trusting the DAO to make intelligent decisions, including electing council members and deciding if a council member truly deserves to be voted off the council. I'm wary to set rigid guidelines that would prevent community recourse in edge cases, because this solution MUST be robust enough to handle edge cases. The more we define explicit criteria for what behaviors are eligible, the more those rules can be worked around to avoid meeting the criteria.

This system IS the failsafe, we shouldn't limit the cases in which it applies.

6. The intent is to abolish the eDAO, and this wording can be improved. Good catch.

Just to be clear on this, are you suggesting a verbal -OR- written vote to qualify as approval to start implementing a solution? If this is the case I'm ok with this addition, and it should apply to literally any platform, so long as it can be made public (after action has been taken ofc). Text message approval would be appropriate in an emergency situation, but these approvals must be documented.

In reality, the CC portion of this arrangement involves pinging the GCM (or contacting a lead/head), and reporting the issue. The community member portion of this arrangement involves pinging multiple parties in Discord and reporting the issue. It could be more clear that reporting individuals aren't responsible for reporting to every entity listed, rather that reporting to any ONE of those entities is acceptable. Pinging more parties in Discord is just a means to ensure someone relevant is alerted to the situation ASAP.

With regards to flagging issues based on criteria - Can you elaborate on how such a system might look, maybe with some examples?

I do see this process as being strictly for time sensitive emergencies, and something that must be explicitly justified to the community as to why normal proposal processes were bypassed, at direct risk of IMC members who approved the action being removed from council by a Vote of No Confidence. Everything that goes through this process, in my mind, is a "red" flagged issue, and if not, I'm likely voting against the council members who supported it.

I'll reiterate that we've had ONE issue that required emergency action in the history of the DAO. Being prepared for another is crucial, but we don't need to build a filtering system for issues that may arise once every year or two (ideally, they never arise), they are inherently case by case.

[fickle mauve]

RE: Stipend - International meeting scheduling is hard, and IMC reps would be expected to attend double the meetings. I'd also prefer for them to take on more responsibility within their sub-council, especially with regards to a responsibility to take notes and convey the IMC's positions to their sub-council and vice versa.

Additionally, being at the highest level of the DAO, there are more responsibilities and potential risks incurred by the IMC members. This includes things like being available for emergencies, and the potential to be the logical first targets for legal action taken against the DAO, as the IMC has the final say in decision making processes.

I do see this position as having nearly double the work, and potentially more than double the responsibility and risk incurred. I would be wary to reduce pay for any position on the council, including the IMC representatives. We may already be risking passing over talent with the current levels of pay.

RE: Stagnant Proposals - I'm opposed to putting firm timelines on how long a proposal can be "in the process" while it's being reviewed by specialized sub-councils. This is limiting in the respect that very technical proposals may take time to research, both in terms of feasibility to implement (Answering: Is this something that can be done?), and more strategic elements (Does this make sense in the current market given competition etc.).

I do agree that clear communication is absolutely critical. If a sub-council identifies an issue with a proposal which has passed the Community Council stage, they should make it clear why there is a delay (this can be a high level overview) and roughly how long they expect the delay to take to clear.

I'm not extremely keen on using colour coded flagging, as Discord doesn't really support that kind of visibility. The current implementation ([Passed|Executed]) is reasonably descriptive for me, and works well with our current setup.

[spare meteor]

Amazing feedback from the community! I'll avoid commenting on too many things at the moment as my initial perspective is already heavily shared in the documentation. Just building on Blickter's point on compensation and the IMC, its not just the time commitment but also the liability and broader perspective required to be effective in these roles. While representing a sub-council, these individuals must be the most strategic and look beyond representing their specialty to set the direction for the DAO. That, in conjunction with the liability of leading an organization of this size and visibility is quite high. I also strongly encourage the DAO to evaluate providing insurance for council members to ensure participation is not hindered by perception of risk. Overall, compensation actually seems quite low at this point for the expectations and risks, but stipends at this level may be necessary until revenue reaches maturity to support necessary increases.

[thin kernel]

These types of insights definitely helping with a better understanding regarding wage. Ty

Maybe having an fortnightly review written up on each proposal (if it takes that long) outlining the delays would help with the communication level. The flagging idea was more for the website - the proposals progress being visible will definitely help communicate it all to the masses with less strain, fo sho.

[feral notch]

What would be the benefit of having more than one CC in the IMC?

Having multiple CCs in the IMC is adding complexity to the document and limiting the number of CCs in the IMC to one (the team admin) and not allowing other CCs from subs to be voted into the IMC would simplify things and align with the ratio of sub councils.

Also like Blickter stated being on the IMC could double your work. The team should have clarity in the requirements of the team member before assigning them to the sub-council. (In case the that is the way we go, assignment over election.)

[feral notch]

RE: Compensation - It would make sense to align it with the passed ICCP-2 and increase IMC council member compensation to $3.75k/month. It had broad support and the only voice of concern was that the amount was too low.

My main argument for coming up with this amount :

I agree we should compensate the council well and it should be competitive with even Fortune 500 board members ($304,856/yr) eventually. But while we are still running on runway and having discussions on extending runway a lower amount equal to the median compensation for members of private company boards of directors ($44,850/yr - 3737.5/month) makes sense to me.

Also at first I thought the double of pay was too steep of an increase and seemed arbitrary. A slightly lower increase (1.85x over 2x) would have most likely not triggered the same response from myself and I would assume others.

At this point this seems like a fair compensation for council members.
$2K/month for community sub-council member
3.75K/month for IMC

[fickle mauve]

Open to community feedback on this, but my take has been that we should wait and see how product launches perform and how effective the Gov V2 structure is, and hold off on making an adjustment to council pay until we have more information. I do anticipate the dollar value assigned to baseline council compensation needing to increase over time, but it does make some amount of sense to keep council pay lower while we trial the systems, and particularly before sustained revenue is coming in. It should be easier to determine an appropriate amount of compensation when we have more information (and ideally a higher token price, resulting in a lower percentage of the Treasury being utilized to pay council members).

If one thing has become extremely clear, it's that council pay WILL need to be revisited in the future, no matter what we set it to.

[feral notch]

One way to keep v2 flexible is to make it so edits to multiple sections of the document are not needed if changes are ever to be recommended.

Here is my version of the doc removing references to the names of the sub-councils outside of the sub-council section also I removed the whole multiple CCs in IMC sections:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/10P1bxjV_5I9DJdC4rPhw9eJLxbkOrlLo_G5fyyhkRG8/edit?usp=sharing

I envision a time when someone wants to create an ICCP to make a change to the existing structure or document. If the details/specifics about gov V2 are as contained as possible in a single section it should make that task simpler.

[iron apex]

This compensation feels significantly more appropriate but at this point in time until the DAO is generating some level of revenue it does make sense to under shoot it for the time being. Once the landscape for both Illuvium and the broader market changes then this will likely be quickly re evaluated.

[iron apex]

All excellent points. I feel Blickter and Deraji hashed out their comments well and answered it no different to how I would have approached it.

Regarding (3) 'action' may need to be better defined instead. Even if we acted on the sentiment vote as soon as it reached the threshold firstly the discussion may be far from over and we would be missing important details as we 'action' it. Also does actioning entail us writing a proposal? Discussing the proposal? Because I assure you we discuss anything that's having heavy discussion already. Regardless of the reacts to it.

(4) is important to me. We need to enable as many mediums for as many kinds of people as possible for the election process. Encouraging both sides of the equation improves engagement across the board.

(2) Ani has said this many times in the past but it's worth noting that in the future. NFT holders will also be able to propose and get more heavily involved in ideas and future game proposals. It will feel pretty unrestrictive at that point. I'd assume illuvitars fall under the same banner.

[glad vigil]

I have to agree with Scruba on number 2. Feeling unrestrictive and being unrestricted is a different thing. We want in the future that anyone with a good idea that can help the DAO can share that idea with everyone.

There is a lot of talk about how crypto wallets are a thing that will turn away some gamers and we want the transition to be as smooth as possible. But for ideas we are adding an extra barrier. Imagine you are new to crypto, you have a wallet, some NFTs there and some coins. You have a great idea you want to share with Illuvium community. But first you need to connect your wallet (with money on it) to the page that some discord bot you never heard of gave you link to. I would rather not.

We should allow anyone to share an idea that might improve Illuvium.

[clever solar]

On the sharing of ideas, I would point out that anyone can share ideas with the community. We have many open discord channels, Twitter, team members, website contacts, and streams at which time anyone not holding ILV or not connected in discord can pass along any good ideas. Having a fairly simple and secure gate keeping process for a formal change being submitted to the DAO doesn’t seem an unreasonable burden. I would push that in the future it would also include all in-game NFT holders as well as ILV holders as they should eventually be the governance voters for the Game Sub-Council so it should be even less restrictive.

I agree with this compensation proposal and am pushing for this to be the standard for implementation at launch of V2. While I agree with the sentiment that we should review compensation after launch, we should try to find an optimal level at first. The current amounts proposed are definitely too low to attract some of the better candidates in the community. I am sympathetic to the ‘wait til we have more income’ arguments but this is a treasury ILV distribution, not runway discussion. Most startups/early stage projects give higher token or equity positions to key contributors early on before product launch. The amounts and percentages will always go down after moving into a steady-state mode because the decision-makers have less impact. You want your best people in the organization earlier, not later because the momentum of the product and organization is harder to change later.

[thin kernel]

Just wanna say that when it does come to the wage aspect, people are forgetting its currently getting paid in ILV. So whilst this $$ amount might not seem enough now.. the work of the council should show through the price of $ILV in the future, with the help of the CC's - Remember the CC's would be unpaid.. so I feel if there is currently suggestion of increase's, it should go to them for the extra added tasks at hand - new system looks to be created to help lessen the burden for the council as whole

$1500/ $3000 would instantly double wen the token does. Yes it may be staked but I am sure if anybody is running for council & is a true believer of the projects longevity, that the $ilv value will go higher 1+ years from now, especially after full release $.$

[jagged ether]

This is a totally anal worthless conversation, but i just thought as I start to read this doc. But do ya want to define ILV HOLDER as at least 1 ILV, what if ILV is worth $10,000 USD in the future Are you going to be this strict?

[gusty warren]

Whats the rationale for it though? Gate keeping connotes that there is an intention to filter something out. What would that be in this case that the three layer process cannot do?

Additionally, if proposals are gated you run the risk of (1) ILV/NFT holders having to propose "inspired" ideas from non-ILV/NFT; (2) you add another layer of complexity for good ideas to be brought to the voting table. As it currently stands, an idea needs to go through these hoops: (1) get an ILV/NFT holder to propose the idea; (2) get 30 ILV holder "likes"; (3) Community Council Approval; (4) Specialized Sub Council Approval; and finally (5) IMC approval.

[spare meteor]

Everything is configurable. 1 ilv makes sense today. In the future the community can absolutely recommend any changes

[gusty warren]

Yep. Broad guidelines which lay the basis for the specific transgressions. So rather than outlining all specific acts you have a motherhood violation to connect it to. Ex. Absences in attending bi-weekly meeting and town halls can fall under Habitual Absences. Failure to vote on proposals or give their positions on ideated IIPs can fall under Gross Negligence. Maligning anyone in the community, council, or team falls under violation of the code of ethics, etc.

The point is that theres a guide and basis for any valid complaint against a council member and to ensure that the Vote of No Confidence cant be used to harass, threaten, and waste the time and effort of both the community and council.

However, I submit that at this juncture Gov v2 may not need a robust guideline as this can be worked on more in future IIPs.

---

On verbal OR written, I lean towards written more. Documentation is important. So if the verbal votes are recorded in the minutes or theres a voice recording, I dont see a problem. Wed like to avoid having hearsay situations.

Also agree any medium should be covered considering the exigent circumstances.

[gusty warren]

Pinging - sounds good.

Criteria Flagging - In the draft, theres no definition of great urgency and the criteria flagging should help address that. Examples were given that may have significant financial implications, involving legal, or reputational matters. It would be good to have broad thresholds otherwise, there may be ambiguity on when EEP will be activated or not.

Like the guidelines on vote of no confidence, I believe this is something that can be a subject of a separate IIP after thorough research and use cases has been shared. So no need to dwell on this topic. Its just food for thought.

[fickle mauve]

As Deraji mentioned, everything can be adjusted. We did discuss a $ value worth of ILV being the threshold, but collab.land doesn't have this functionality at the moment. There are a few metrics like this that can be switched to better solutions as those solutions start to exist.

[sinful iris]

Gatekeeping for discussion of proposals is already in place. But Stage 1 of a proposal seems open to anyone with an interest. If a proposal was started in #1020759212172775464 (or anywhere really) by someone unable to post in #1024051771624136774 (or a custom built gov forum dapp) but it finds enough support to make them ask to move it to Stage 2 and start working on a google doc with the community manager and opening a governance thread, then it does not seem like it matters if the original “author” is an officially recognized DAO member or not. They may not be able to participate in the governance threads discussions. But they would have written the initial proposal AND still would have access to the google doc. And to get out of Stage 2 there is some degree of certified DAO member approval (technically 30 votes from any community members). And after moving into Stage 3, authorship seems fairly irrelevant.

However, if someone at Stage 1 is unable to find an actual DAO member willing to attach their name in support of an idea then there should be no reason to waste the community manager’s time getting a google doc and governance post ready.

[gusty warren]

Again, what purpose does it serve to gate keep it in the first place? Thats what I would like to come out of this discussion. I may be missing the point and would like to be illuminated.

[sinful iris]

The gatekeeping for gov channel discussions was to keep things aligned with the interest of actual ILV holders. But I think that isn’t the same thing as gatekeeping the right to make a proposal.

Perhaps it comes down to defining the nature of DAO membership. I assume DAO membership would always ultimately be verified on-chain. But if anyone can make a proposal then it sounds to me like all it takes to be a DAO member is to say that you are member.

Limiting proposals to ILV holders/stakers could arguably be encouraging decentralization of the ILV token supply.

[gusty warren]

I think the fact that all proposals are voted on by ILV (dao) members before its acted upon by the community sub council is the gate keep which is aligned with your intention.

Do we still need to make it that the author of the proposal should come from an ILV/dao member?

[feral notch]

Perhaps the goal of gatekeeping was to put a speed bump up for trolls, shorters or others with malicious intent from spreading FUD or clogging up the system?

Could we keep idea posting open to anyone?

Should the upvoting (community sentiment requirement) be limited to stakers, for strategy/marketing ideas? Stakers and NFT holders for gaming ideas?

Should we limit all the governance features of $ILV to just stakers, like we did with voting in the council election?

Current privileges of holding $ILV:

• Get to discuss in governance channels

Current privileges of staking $ILV:

• Get to discuss in governance channels
• Get to vote for council members

What is the value of giving holders any privileges?

[sinful iris]

Certainly anyone could write it. I thought that I’ve been sharing things that support this.

Idea posting is open to anyone. And seems like it would remain that way. Nothing is an actual proposal until the community manager has worked with the idea author anyways. Prior to that it’s just an idea looking for support inside the community. I cannot think of any way that the development of ideas could be restricted anyways. (Other than the nuclear option of turning off all chat channels on all social platforms, which won’t be happening)

The sentence “Proposals may be initiated by any ILV Holder or Staker” is not necessarily talking about authorship. Nor does it prohibit non holders/stakers. It is a sentence that could be removed. But it also makes it clear that it’s not just the team that can initiate proposals.
I’m not convinced that “Proposals may be initiated by anyone in the Illuvium community” is a more accurate sentence. But maybe.

[fickle mauve]

I'll reiterate that this (from my perspective) was largely a miscommunication on our part. When this was drafted, we were operating on the assumption that #1024051771624136774 was going to be the place for formalized proposals to be posted for community review, and further that posting in that forum would be gated to ILV Holders/Stakers (the Discord roles). Those roles are gated to 1 ILV held or staked.

There is absolutely no reason to limit ideation to ILV Holders or Stakers. We're a smart bunch, but ignoring any good idea cooked up by a non-ILV Holder/Staker would be pretty conceited.

We're also still talking a bit about process and how we want to handle review of proposals.

Currently, the way things (mostly) work is that proposals would start in #1020759212172775464 , where sentiment is collected and feedback is integrated. When a proposal is "ready" for a vote, it gets moved by Rich to #1024051771624136774 , where there's a final review of the completed proposal prior to voting. Currently, that forum is a repository, but also a place for final discussions.

My preference would be for general ideas to live in #1020759212172775464 , and for ILV Holders/Stakers to be able to post formalized proposals in #1024051771624136774 . My preference would be that sentiment gathering is done in that forum, along with integrating any further feedback. Part of the idea with this is to prevent IIPs that have no actual support from ILV Holders/Stakers from moving to a vote (this includes potential nuisance IIPs), because #1024051771624136774 can be limited to where only ILV Holders/Stakers can react/post etc.

[gusty warren]

Tbh, its all sounds convoluted. Its literally a 6 step process for an idea to be passed. With 3 types of gate keeping.

1. Post an idea in #1020759212172775464
2. Get an ILV holder to make it into a proposal
3. Get 30 ILV holders to like 👍
4. Get community council to approve.
5. Get sub council to approve
   And finally 6. Get IMC to approve.

Also, why does community council have to wait for a formalized proposal to start the process? Wouldnt it make more sense for community council to actually be the one to post it on #1024051771624136774 ?

So process would be ideas then picked up by community council and reworked into a proper IIP which only ILV holders get to vote to elevate to the specialized sub council and eventually approved or denied by the IMC?

[fickle mauve]

The community council votes on proposals, they don't choose which ones get put to a vote. That has to be something that lies with the community.

They should help with formalizing proposals, they can give feedback, but ultimately we don't want a system where the community council (or any council) just ignores proposals the community wants. They vote, they don't decide what goes to a vote.

The way I'd like things to work (personally) is:

1. Any generic idea, in any format, can be posted in #1020759212172775464 . From here, the idea can be fleshed out and iterated on. Not all ideas require a formal proposal, some ideas are just ideas.
2. Ideas that require a formalized proposal are formatted to IIP/ICCP format, and posted in #1024051771624136774 . This is where sentiment voting should happen, to ensure it's ILV Holders/Stakers voting.
3. Voting (Community, then relevant specialized SCs, then IMC).

[spare meteor]

I'm not sure this is convoluted as much as it is multiple linear steps to progress through. However, the intent is for the system to scale as the community grows and ideas come from more individuals. Having stages of the process insure focus is put on the most valuable and supported ideas. I am working on another clarification that would eliminate #6 above from some proposals, as there are things that (in my opinion) should end with the subcouncils. I'm not sure which other step would be helpful to remove as they each serve a pretty distinct function at this stage. Governing by community by its nature takes time. If the desire is to go change quickly, involve fewer people, which is the opposite of governing through decentralization.

[feral notch]

Here is my minor tweak of the Emergency Proposal Process Diagram, just keeping the flow of how the IMC is involved.

My main concern with v2 in general is the heavy reliance on Government Community Manager.

[iron apex]

I see step 3 as more like a discussion phase for ILV holders. The proposal is already being worked on and close to a vote. Its a place where the investors and councils come together and formalise the entire IIP

[glad vigil]

I don’t know why are we even writing a proposal if the idea can’t get 30 upvotes.

[sinful iris]

It looks like we can’t even get 30 reactions to gov v2

[pastel mulch]

Soon

[feral notch]

From my count we have 42 positive unique upvotes. From this and the original #1056018831941840906. Might be off by 1 or 2 but that's not even including the extra weight from council upvotes (which I like and hope we keep in v2)

[sinful iris]

Haha. Touché

[glad vigil]

"If a proposal reaches 30 approval votes from the community over a 14 day period then it elevates to the Community Council."

I think wording here need to change or be improved from the yesterdays example.

[gusty warren]

Honestly its really a bad metric. I dont have a solution for this just voicing its a bad one for proposals to move to the next step.

[glad vigil]

And there is also a problem that with a number you have to change it quite often if the project is growing.

[fickle mauve]

There's also a provision where you vote your council members out if they are being obtuse and forcing through proposals that need revision.

Can we acknowledge that we're not voting on an unpopular proposal without revision "because 30 votes!"

[glad vigil]

I know we aren’t, but what I’m saying is that the gov v2 doc should change accordingly. Because it seems like we are.

[fickle mauve]

To whom does it seem like we are?

I'm genuinely confused about why there's a voting process at all if the assumption is that elected council members would act against the interest of the project by ramrodding through proposals that need work. All our messaging around IIP-30 has been that we're willing to revise it. Gov V2 has been revised MANY times based on community feedback already. Nearly every proposal we've passed this epoch has had elements of community feedback integrated. If future councils don't agree to follow that precedent and ethos, vote them out, they are the wrong people to have sitting as a council. There's a mechanism for that.

If we wanted to catch every place where a council could potentially act in bad faith, we could do that. I'm just not sure we'd catch them all, and I'm not sure it's necessary when there's recourse to deal with that behavior.

[glad vigil]

I’m not saying that council seems to push every proposal with 30 votes or anything bad about council or anyone in particular. There is nothing personal.

I’m saying that it seems (in the gov v2 document in that one sentence) that in the future we will push every proposal with 30 upvotes to community council. And I just think that that one sentences needs updating. What proposals are pushed to community council in gov v2.

[spare meteor]

the role of the community council is to further build out the proposal, so it's not going to an implementation vote at that point. I don't think its the worst thing to leave the process as is, as updates will happen at that stage. The question may be whether 30 votes is correct. As we've seen in the Illuvitar IIP discussion, it's possible to get a LOT of responses pretty quickly when the community really cares about the topic. (110+ votes in less than 12 hours)

[glad vigil]

But there will be important topics that not a lot of people care about, but are still important. Those proposals also somehow have to be involved.

[clever solar]

If a proposal has 30 upvotes, that means it’s serious enough to the community to be considered. In this case, the council would have voted no on that version and remanded the IIP for further review. The 30 vote threshold means that an IIP like this can’t be ignored by the council. It doesn’t mean it has to be passed.

[glad vigil]

It first goes to Community council but I understand what you mean and I guess I agree. Even though I still think the wording and the metric for deciding that is kind of not up to par. But I guess Community council is there to decide what need to pass to other Councils and what needs rework.

[clever solar]

Yes. This is actually the perfect example for the structure

The idea here would go to community council first who are going to get a sense of sentiment and which topics are most critical to address

They would presumably either decline the IIP entirely and scrap the idea or make major edits and then submit an adjusted version for review by the second level of sub-councils

Nothing is skipping the community sub-council so all of this gets fully vetted out in the open

[gusty warren]

Are we expecting to release the revised version anytime soon as a proposal or are the council planning to release it as an IIP for voting directly?

[pastel mulch]

Yes it will be released as a revised proposal

[gusty warren]

Thanks! Looking forward to the new version!