Jagdkampf in the Bundeswehr of 1985-1990 was a demanding infantry capability within Cold War defense, not a marginal niche. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, West Germany was expected to be a main battlefield, and Jagdkampf was meant to strike the enemy in his rear rather than fight only at the front. Its aim was to disrupt command posts, communications, supply lines, reserves, and other key installations through surprise, covert movement, raids, and ambushes. Jagdkommandos were intended to deny the enemy any sense of security behind his own lines and force him to divert substantial troops to rear-area protection.
A key strength of the German approach was that Jagdkampf was not reserved solely for elite special forces. It was rooted in the infantry arm and could, in principle, be carried out by regular infantry formations led by specially trained commanders. This gave the Bundeswehr depth, flexibility, and a broader force base for such operations. Jagdkampf depended on resilience, initiative, fieldcraft, and tactical maturity, allowing small units cut off from support to create disproportionate operational effects.
The rear area was also seen as decisive. Roads, bridges, depots, communications nodes, and critical infrastructure were vital targets and vulnerabilities. Jagdkampf therefore included both offensive action in enemy rear areas and defensive action against enemy raiders, airborne forces, or special operations troops in one's own rear.
A Jagdkampf platoon could include sniper team, and up to four infantry squads, supported by specialists such as medics, signals, engineers, fire support, air defense, dog handlers, or documentation teams. In practice, German infantry battalions could muster such commandos;
So each division should field them!
The new unit would be a larger rear-area security commando of roughly 16-18 men, with traits MP, security, dog, and reservist , likely drawn from Wehrbereichskommandos, to hunt SOF, raiders, saboteurs, and spies.