#GIP-XX Council Term Limits

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hushed wren
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Simple Summary:
This proposal aims to increase decentralization, innovation, accountability and community participation in governance by introducing council term limits.

Overview:
The Illuvium Main Council (IMC) and the Illuvium Community Council (ICC) play a crucial role in shaping the governance of the Illuvium DAO. However, the absence of term limits can lead to centralization of influence, reduced community engagement, and potential governance stagnation. To maintain the integrity of decentralized governance, this proposal introduces term limits to ensure regular leadership rotation. Specifically, it proposes:

  1. A maximum of four (4) terms per council,
  2. A maximum of two (2) consecutive terms per council,
  3. A mandatory cooldown period of one (1) term after serving for two (2) consecutive terms in a council,
  4. The term limits calculation applies retrospectively,
  5. The Illuvium Sub-Councils term is counted as an ICC term,
  6. Council members who leave during an epoch due to resignation or VoNC are considered to have completed a term,
  7. Council replacements who serve less than half of an epoch are not considered to have completed a term,
  8. The term limits do not apply to the Illuvium Labs representative.

This measure will encourage fresh perspectives, enhance decision-making, and uphold the principles of decentralization.

Risk and Mitigation

  • Loss of Talent and Expertise
    There is a risk of losing experienced and skilled members from the council. This risk can be mitigated by electing them to serve as Committee members, where they can continue to contribute their expertise.
  • Shortage of Candidates
    There is a risk of having an insufficient number of candidates to fill council positions. This risk can be mitigated by reviewing and adjusting the term limits if necessary to ensure a stable and functional governance structure.

Full proposal:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TgY4UKZcsX1xhvgJ2DamIIc1PqxO3gpIVB2TsCLVhJc/edit?usp=sharing

term_limits.jpg
Google Docs
GIP-XX Council Term Limits

GIP-XX Council Term Limits Simple Summary: This proposal aims to increase decentralization, innovation, accountability and community participation in governance by introducing council term limits. Overview: The Illuvium Main Council (IMC) and the Illuvium Community Council (ICC) play a crucia...

remote agate
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Few things:

It was always a popularity contest because you can't learn anything about anybody. You have no idea who you voting for. Most people only heard about content creators and popular X accounts because they are not active in the community. It was never (in most cases) about talent and expertise. That should be priority for the last 3 years, but we keep ignoring it.

With a lot of new council members beginning of the terms will be a bit more challenging and time consuming for the team members (one would think so) because they need to have them brief and whatever. Not sure if that is true, but from the outside it seems that could waste some time (probably not a lot).

Realistically, there is no way this passes IMC vote.

hushed wren
# remote agate Few things: It was always a popularity contest because you can't learn anything...

Hi binet
Based on my experience in the ICC and IMC, the onboarding/handover was done by the exiting council members. Ex councils are usually still around too to help out with questions.

Yes, I agree that we need a minimum required competence for the council members and some introduction for the nominees. Maybe these for a separate proposal?

Since this is a governance proposal, we will need 7 votes from IMC and ICC

red smelt
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I downvoted because I think this is solving a non-existent problem. The two risks you outlined are my biggest concerns here, and I don't think the mitigation plan really addresses it.

I am for decentralization and if we had a deep pool of qualified (and interested) candidates to participate in governance I would be more for it, and at that time I would say it moves from a non-existent problem to an existing one.

I believe it's counterproductive to say that someone doing a good job is restricted from running again in the future. The risk of benching existing talent vs. the reward of seating new talent is a bad ratio imo.

With that said, I think eventually this will become relevant, and there is something we can pass now that makes it easier to enact later. I agree with Binet's sentiment that this would struggle to pass through current council, so my recommendation would be to pass a GCCP now that establishes the ability for the community to later call for a full-governance-ILV-vote to enact term limits. This bypasses the ability for council to block something that would directly impact their rule.

Additionally/separately, I agree with binet that the campaigning/voting process falls far short of nominations being reviewed based on merit and i hope to contribute to making that better, but it's a tough problem to solve and it takes the voting body caring enough to actually learn about the nominees.

thx Jag hope this perspective is helpful

hushed wren
# red smelt I downvoted because I think this is solving a non-existent problem. The two risk...

Hi jp,
Thanks for the feedback.
Based on the last two previous elections we saw many good people aspiring to join the council.
imo the high concentration of vILV makes it harder for new people to be elected.

as we can see the current sentiment towards the council is really low. there are sentiments to make council pay zero or even to get rid of the council.
maybe the community does not see as doing a good job.

red smelt
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No argument there, i think reform of how vILV is calculated (and/or maybe blacklisting certain team wallets? I’m iffy on the fairness of this though) would better address that issue by making those new people more electable. Ultimately if the community is unhappy with a councilor, they shouldn’t be re-elected through the established means of voting; likewise if the community is happy with a councilor, they shouldn’t have a term limit.

hushed wren
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most of the vILV is owned by a few people. the community does not really have that much of a say

red smelt
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That’s the problem to fix then! Lol

odd birch
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Having a 2 consecutive term rule and forcing them to take a 1 term cooldown period is fine. I dont think its necessary to have a maximum term limit. I dont think we should be depriving the DAO of an effective council member in future epochs.

I would recommend that you cant serve in any council during the cooldown period and that the 2 consecutive terms applies even if you sat in both councils.

Ex. 1 term ICC and 2nd term IMC = cooldown period for 1 term.

It defeats the purpose if you have someone just take a cool off term by being elected in the other council.

On retroactive application, it shouldnt apply past epoch 10. Meaning epoch 10 is already counted as 1 term. Passing proposals that apply retroactively will set a bad precedent. "lex prospicit, non respicit" the law looks forward and not backward. By applying retroactively, youre penalizing those who sat on council before with no basis. Plus, in the proposal you mention that it starts epoch 11 yet make it retroactive. So theres discrepancy there for sure.

hushed wren
odd birch
# hushed wren Hi scrub, thanks for the feedback. The main purpose of this proposal is to limit...

Which is why the suggestion is to just have 2 consecutive terms regardless whichever council then take a term cool down. You achieve the main goal of having different people on council this way.

With how its currently worded, you can end up with the same 9 people. Theyre just switching from IMC to ICC for their cooldown.

If X was IMC 2 terms. Then next term goes into ICC for 2 terms then goes back to IMC for 2 more terms and then goes back to ICC for the last 2 tersm. Thats literally 8 terms of serving non-stop. The cooldown was basically circumvented.

Vs.

X serves IMC/ICC 2 terms (regardless if its mix or not). Has to take 1 term cooldown giving other people opportunity to sit in either council.

the calculation is restrospective, meaning it is counting past epochs.
the result of this calculation is applied in epoch 11, instead of now

And I disagree with this. It shouldnt count before epoch 10. Reckoning point (if this passes) should be current epoch. Retroactive application of proposals sets a really bad precedent.

hushed wren
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Are you open to max term limit?

odd birch
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Im not closed off to it. mean if we apply the mandatory 1 term cool down at current max limit without retroactive application. its gonna take someone close to 4 years to hit the max term limit.

pine junco
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I appreciate the effort put into this proposal and the goal of strengthening decentralization and governance within Illuvium.

However, there are important risks to consider. The retrospective application of term limits could create short-term governance disruption, especially since past elections have often seen the same roughly 10 individuals running. If half of them suddenly become ineligible, we could face a shortage of qualified candidates, making the next election highly unpredictable. While decentralization is a priority, we also need to ensure continuity and efficiency, especially in a complex ecosystem like Illuvium. If term limits were not applied retroactively, we would still face this challenge, just two years later, so the issue is inevitable but should be carefully managed.

Additionally, while rotating council members prevents power consolidation, there’s a possibility that experienced members will simply move between councils (IMC ↔ ICC) rather than truly opening the door for new voices. We should consider whether the proposed cooldown period is sufficient to prevent this effect.

Another concern i have is that with a small pool of individuals running, term limits could force out highly experienced and impactful council members only to be replaced by less knowledgeable or inactive members, weakening governance instead of strengthening it. Decentralization is important, but it should not come at the cost of effectiveness

That said, if the goal is true decentralization, a more impactful change might be to alter the VILV voting formula. Past elections, just a handful of wallets effectively elect the entire council, which limits broader community participation and is likely the reason why many community members doesn't feel well represented. Addressing this structural issue could have a far greater impact on decentralization than term limits alone.

hushed wren
# pine junco I appreciate the effort put into this proposal and the goal of strengthening dec...

hi dr spoon
Thanks for the feedback.
Retrospectively, there are only 2 people who have or close to 4-terms in the imc and two people who have 2 consecutive terms.
we have many qualified candidates from the ICC who can fill the seats, and we have more in the community who can fill the ICC.
as for the rotation, we have already seen this happening.
idk no rotation kinda sounds too harsh. Since there is a max term limit on each council, the person is going to run out of terms eventually.

now the question: do you really need highly experienced people in the council?

idk what to change in the formula. people still can cleverly do a sybil attack on the voting, argueably if someone is in the council long enough they can sybil it for free using the past salary

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even a whale can split their wallet into 2 wallet and already got much more voting power

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1 wallet of 100 staked ilv = 10 vILV
2 wallets of 50 staked ilv = 14 vILV

pine junco
pine junco
mortal girder
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just end council. This whole thing adds zero value to Illuvium.

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and the team doesn't care about IIPs or GFPs anyway so...

hushed wren
pine junco
hushed wren
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where else you can get $3750/month with the amount of work lol

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even $1500/month is a lot with the required hours

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ok apedao paid $19k/month so theres that

mortal girder
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yeah obviously council care more about their paycheck than they do with the DAO

hushed wren
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alternatively we can do an IIP to introduce a Referendum Vote.
then stakers can vote to keep or dissolve the council

mortal girder
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yes please do it and let's end this charade.

pine junco
mortal girder
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just make a normal proposal and see where the council is at

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then go from that

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I'm gonna love reading how they'll try to justify their position

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the only argument I see is if council ends then ILV becomes a meme coin since there's no governance.

hushed wren
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but revdis

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and u still can vote on proposals using vILV

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and save $280K/year

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it's not a lot compared to $60m tho

mortal girder
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this is not about the money

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it's about the usefulness of council

old river
odd birch
# old river <@&814435151307866142> what's your opinion on this and overall this topic that's...

Should be discussed in a different thread so as not to muddy the discussion here.

But my perspective is that I have no issues if Illuvium DAO just turns into a regular company. However, the people we should hear from is Kieran and the rest of the original founders/admin. They were the one that pitched a DAO system. I know people keep saying were DAO for tax incentive purposes but Im sure they had other reasons why we continue to be a DAO.

My question here is what are the implications with the tokens, decision-making, transparency and accountability. Have people thought past just dissolving the council/DAO?

And my take on why there is a council in a DAO is that there are so many things that needs to be disclosed to the council to make an informed decision on proposals. Obviously, without that layer, it would be almost impossible to share to the whole DAO for voting purposes as it can create issues with "insider trading" or front-running.

Anyway, thats my initial take. We should go back to the proposal again. If you want to discuss further than this either my DMs are open or we have a separate topic on it.

coarse terrace
# old river <@&814435151307866142> what's your opinion on this and overall this topic that's...

There is a lot of value in the DAO and council like Scrubs just said. Do they get paid more than is probably necessary, I think that goes without saying. The problem is that the layer of risk for the IMC is hard to analyse when it comes to a financial cost.

But the NDA layer between the community and team is really important. What happens if we switch to vILV votes for new proposals, and then the proposal gets voted in for a subject literally impossible for the team to achieve, what do they even do in that situation? We could give them VETO powers, but then why even have a decentralised system at all.

Ultimately I think there's only 2 paths here.

  1. The current system, which means the community has a voice that is guaranteed to be heard by the team.

  2. The team is not bound by the community at all and is left to their own devices entirely.

I think its fine either way, one of the big differences with 2025 that hasn't been available in any other year, is for the first time a Western Country has become somewhat pro crypto. Any Crypto startup had a huge layer of risk associated with not becoming decentralised but Trump does change that entire landscape. I think if they put Crypto regulation set in stone, it would be the perfect opportunity to switch up to option 2.

coarse terrace
mortal girder
coarse terrace
# mortal girder no most likely I won't.

I will ask what the actual cost to dissolve the DAO is in the next meeting. Because its not free as far as I'm aware. Since then Labs has to do all this other legal shit.

old river
hushed wren
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you dont need to have a council to be dao

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there are two main potential benefit of being a dao:

  • corporate tax exemption
  • good narrative that the project is led by the community
coarse terrace