#Governance Change Proposal - Durable IIP

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vapid urchin
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Simple Summary
It will benefit the DAO to have a class of decision that is harder to change than an IIP.

Abstract
Currently decisions made by the council can be reversed by making a new IIP. It requires only a single majority vote to make this reversal. However in some cases a decision is only meaningful when it endures. This IIP introduces a class of decision called a Durable IIP which requires super-majority votes across multiple epochs in order to be reversed, changed, or overruled.

Overview
The proposed Durable IIP is similar in all ways to an IIP, except for those outlined below:

  • A Durable IIP requires a unanimous vote to be approved rather than a majority.

  • To reverse or change a Durable IIP two separate, sequential, council epochs must both vote to remove the Durable IIP. Both votes must reach a super majority of 75% (4 of 5 votes in the current structure) in order for the decision to be changed or reversed.

  • The epoch that voted in the Durable IIP cannot be one of the two epochs required to vote out the Durable IIP.

  • To ensure its value, no standard IIP, or Durable IIP, may override the decisions made in another Durable IIP, other than by voting it out via the rules defined above. For this reason care should be taken to ensure Durable IIPs are simply written and limited in scope, typically by proposing a single idea or value.

A normal IIP can be promoted to a Durable IIP, simply by following the procedure above.

Rationale
By providing some guarantees of a decisions endurance, and by making a decision more difficult to change, we will be able to build confidence in the DAOs long term direction. This will help the DAO attract investors and players. It will also help to ensure that large or expensive strategic activities can proceed without the risk of them being derailed by a single vote.

As an example consider the plan to ensure 5% of in-game revenue is distributed to land holders who produce Fuel for the main game. This 5% figure is a good candidate for a Durable IIP.

This proposed IIP itself would also be another good candidate for a Durable IIP.

Test Cases
NA

cinder oasis
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18 months to change an IIP is a very long time

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there are some things that need to be durable, for example revdis

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im not sure this is a good idea, once an IIP is passed, you cant even do an ICCP

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Not even if u have a typo

polar sedge
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do not give them such power. this is just a way for them to keep u where they want u, a way to make your voice irrelevant once they have decided something. knowing council they look out only for the interest of token holders, so any decision that is not favorable for the project itself, but only benefits the council/bag holders will be kept and preserved forever and theres nothing we can do about it.

cinder oasis
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to be fair, voting for a Durable IIP should have the same requirement to reverse or change it.
i would suggest a Durable IIP need a referendum instead of a council vote

cinder oasis
polar sedge
cinder oasis
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this proposal has merit, because u dont want things to change drastically every 9 months.
For example next epoch could revert IZ IIP, but i trust the people in council wont do that.
another example, what if we need to change the revdis weighting of treasury? Or if we need another safety pool?
im not comfortable with the 2 epochs vote to change a Durable IIP

arctic lichen
# polar sedge yeah, imagine selling stuff for 72m and having to take from token stakers, only ...

While you're afforded to have your opinion on council, labs and what not, I hope you can refrain from derailing the topic at hand here.

Also, it seems to be a faulty reasoning to expect that the product that generated 72m (mostly in silv2) will be redistributed to the land holders. You basically gave a rebate for buying land during the auction. So again this neither here nor there for this topic.

But going back to proposal, I echo jaganites concern here. It will take too long to reverse a durable IIP. Not to mention that the imc has power to decide what is a durable iip or not.

Referendum is a good alternative but I'd suggest deeper. We as a dao create a constitutional list of topics that are subject of referendum vote or at least ratification.

What does this mean? There's a specific set of topics that requires a dao (snapshot) vote to pass as an additional requirement. We can make it that this dao vote can even overturn IMC votes whether affirmative or negative. It's a process that can bypass our IMC should the DAO feel strongly about it.

However, this list is very specific and exhaustive. It should be scrutinized that it involves the very tenets of the dao and/or topics that IMC itself is affected.

Example: revdis parameters, governance structures (gov v2/v3), Council pay, replacement of Labs studio or executives (extreme example), choosing next game to develop, etc.

cinder oasis
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i like the idea of making some things to be constitutional

half ledge
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Seems like this would be a good addition for specific needs, but what is the purpose of this part, or a scenario where it becomes helpful?

"The epoch that voted in the Durable IIP cannot be one of the two epochs required to vote out the Durable IIP."

cinder oasis
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You need 2 subsequent epochs to revert/revise the Durable IIP

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Example, the Council passed an IIP to develop Beyond TCG this epoch (epoch 9). That IIP can only be reverted/revised if 2 epochs (10 and 11) vote to

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which in my opinion making a revision or cancellation highly unlikely

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Imagine the exact same ICCP need to be voted over 18 months

arctic lichen
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By then it would be too late

half ledge
cinder oasis
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Like revision in the same epoch?

nimble ice
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If I could vote to do away with the DAO permanently I would. Frankly, I just want to know who is going to be in charge, decide whether I like the way they do things and either give them my money or not give them my money. Ever changing governance is the reason I didn't invest more.

I am trying to decide though if this plan makes things better or worse. On the one hand I like the idea of less frequent changes as investors (including me) like stability. I like that "promises made = promises kept" will happen more often. On the other hand if we have one epoch that has too many of the wrong people get into governance, we could be screwed for a long time. What are the chances of that happening? I don't know.

half ledge
cinder oasis
cinder oasis
half ledge
cinder oasis
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need OP to answer that, i personally disagree for such rigid decision.
to me web3 is fast-changing, imo the strenght of ILV is its ability to adapt

half ledge
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yep

cinder oasis
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and i have trust in the dao system
i have trust in the community that we will vote the right people to be in the council
i understand that some degree of stability is needed for investors, but this proposal is too rigid for my taste

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the way i see it, gov v3 is a consolidation. the founders have the most vILV.
1 of IMC is a founder
3 if IMC were voted by founders.
i just dont see the need for further consolidation yet

vapid urchin
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Just noting this was written when epochs were much shorter.

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Some adjustment may be needed.

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Maybe an alternative is a special emergency mechanism such as 80% or 90% of admins AND council members voting something out.

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That said this is not supposed to be for decisions that might put the DAO at risk.

vapid urchin
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It can literally be usef to stop the council flip-flopping on decisions, particularly but not exclusivley when an epoch leads to personnel changes.

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The expectation is this would be used rarely, mainly when we want a promise of some future financial mechanism to come with a degree of certainty.

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Anyway will leave it with you guys to discuss.

cinder oasis
vapid urchin
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No, but we could it's a risk mitigation.

meager python
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Not sure we should give up flexibility for a flip-flop safety net

vapid urchin
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Its not only for that us just one thing it addresses.

The primary purpose as per the rationale statement is for ensuring investors and players know what they are getting in to by providing something more stable and binding than a regular IIP.

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Also it seems people may be misunderstanding, this system is an addition which should be used in special circumstances, not a replacement.

The scope for what is allowed to be a Durable IIP as well as the entry criteria could be made stricter if there is concern on that.

Personally I'd feel a lot better if things like the 5% share of in-game revenue for land holders was something that was more protected than it is. Theoretically it could be cut on a whim.

Sure that probably won't happen, but who knows when a hostile council or a convincing argument might arise.

half ledge
young brook
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I like the fundamental idea of being able to give more security to especially financial based decisions, but would agree with scruba that I am not convinced the above iteration of how to give that security wouldn´t have the potential to come with potential problems as well.

It seems certainly worth to consider multiple options of how to go after the "give more security" to certain IIPs topic.

polar sedge
nimble ice
half ledge
# nimble ice You tell me.

I have similar thoughts at times, but even Elon Musk's companies have boards of directors. DAO should similarly be there to help collaborate on direction but not overstep.

nimble ice
# half ledge I have similar thoughts at times, but even Elon Musk's companies have boards of ...

True, but share holders don't think that if they get enough thumbs up from other share holders they can cause massive disruptions to the company. Which some people seem to think is the way it is (should be?) here.

I agree with your last statement. We have an interesting community with tons of different backgrounds and experiences. They should be tapped into but not overstepping is the big thing.

Sorry, Johnny if that was kind of off=topic to your proposal.

cerulean marten
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I think this is important and necessary, for confidence and governance stability like you said.

  1. Like @cinder oasis mentioned, I feel like the initial requirement is not enough: "A Durable IIP requires a unanimous vote to be approved rather than a majority."
    I think it should be this plus a 75% referendum or something like that. Or maybe the addition of a super majority vote from the previous council epoch. Otherwise, it may be too easy to pass Durable IIPs, which is just as dangerous if not more as not having durable IIPs.

  2. "The epoch that voted in the Durable IIP cannot be one of the two epochs required to vote out the Durable IIP." What is the reasoning for this?

  3. I do like the idea of @arctic lichen Scrubadubdad to make a list of topics limiting the application of Durable IIPs.

stray aspen
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Fantastic.
Ensuring some stability is paramount.
Too many cooks changing the recipe, no one knows what they are eating anymore.

cinder oasis
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ur back

stray aspen
primal niche
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Any further news on this @vapid urchin ? Is there an IIP in the works?