#Understanding & Improving Governance Participation in Illuvium

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shy vale
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Background

Illuvium is the second largest NFT/Gaming DAO in terms of treasury size and 6th largest in terms of token holders. But when comparing lifetime participants and the total number of votes received, it slips to the 12th and 15th positions respectively.

To get a sense of recent activity: in the previous council elections, a proposal received 320 votes on average, with 386 unique voters participating in the process, which is only ~1% of the total voter population.

DeepDAO(https://deepdao.io/organizations) believes that it is possible to find the reason behind this and point toward measures to improve voter participation.

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How to address this

Governance activity in different DAOs can tell us about the character of a wallet.

For example, from a brief look at this $ILV holder's DAO resume: blockomoco.eth (unable to post a link here, so please search for the address on DeepDAO), we can clearly see that the address is interested in NFTs. Introducing governance badges or POAPs might incentivize them to stay active in governance and onboard 100s of similar addresses that are interested in NFTs but do not yet participate in the DAO. The same goes for starting guilds if there are large enough segments of people that are interested in gig work or forming partnerships with communities with the most number of mutual voters.

Thus, having a granular breakdown of DAO members in terms of their interests will help Illuvium optimize its governance process and strengthen its community.

This proposal aims to create interest and activity-based segmentation of $ILV token holders so that the DAO can find methods to retain and onboard new addresses to Illuvium’s governance.

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Methodology

A very high-level plan of action for analyzing the 36k+ ILV token holders is:

  1. Get the DAO resumes of all $ILV token holders (granular activity & memberships), as aggregated by DeepDAO

  2. Based on (1):

    Label each address’s interest (NFTs, DeFi, Investments, Gaming, gig work, etc.) “Interest” is defined as membership or activity in a DAO category over a threshold.

    Label their activity on Illuvium (persistent voter, long-term dormant address, non-voter, an address that used to participate, an address that is getting less interested in participating over time, and more.)

  3. Repeat step 2 with different interest/activity categories to optimize the segmentation. We now have a well-segmented view of $ILV token holders with info on how large each segment is.

  4. Label bots & vote miners: recent research by DeepDAO identified voting miners' activity across the DAO ecosystem. We use this data to check for malicious actors.

  5. Based on DeepDAO’s domain expertise in Web3 and governance, work with Illuvium to define the right incentives/onboarding steps for each segmented group.

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hey folks! Looking forward to your feedback on this approach

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happy to share more details if this sound interesting to the DAO:)

lean yacht
shy vale
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You can see a lot of stats from treasury to governance to members to coalitions on DeepDAO [unable to share a link to your profile 😦 ]

lean yacht
shy vale
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@lean yacht will the DAO be interested in something like this?

tropic wagon
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is it free?

shy vale
tropic wagon
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so this thread is about promoting your services?

shy vale
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I'd say this thread is more about improving governance participation in Illuvium. If we can be of service there, then that's great!

tropic wagon
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nice try bro

wary hare
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Incentivized voting is a mixed bag. I'd absolutely like to see more participation in governance, but not because someone can get a cookie for pushing a button.

wary hare
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In researching this, there's 2 schools of thought.

  1. Incentivizing voters will result in lower quality of outcomes. (This basically implies that people will go vote to get the thing, without bothering to get informed)

  2. Incentivizing voters will cause those incentivized voters to get informed as part of the knowledge that they will vote to obtain the incentive.

I've found a few studies on the subject (happy to share if anyone's interested, but can't link here) and there are more studies supporting the first school, though some do support the latter.

It would be difficult for the DAO to get data on whether people are less, equally, or more informed on the vote with and without incentivized voting. Most of the experiments require a 2x2 design, where participants are polled on their knowledge of candidates and issues before the vote, and after the vote, and are then split into 2 groups for incentives/no incentives.

TL;DR: No doubt to me whether it would increase turnout, it absolutely would, but beyond that we'd be taking a shot in the dark about whether voters were of lower or higher quality.

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I should add that I personally wouldn't have any interest in paying for demographic information. Everyone currently interested in Illuvium can be categorized as an investor, a gamer, or an NFT colletor/trader. Given the options for incentives available to us, more information isn't meaningful in informing HOW we could incentivize voters.

foggy chasm