finite parcel
For people running Claw on a VPS, how are you handling sensitive credentials?
I mean API keys, service credentials, personal info, addresses, etc. — anything Claw may need, but you don’t really want sitting on the server.
Do you keep only minimum creds there, use some local/approval flow, or is there a recommended pattern?
hexed pelicanBOT
Recommended pattern is: treat the VPS as a trusted machine, but give it the smallest useful blast radius.
Practical setup I’d use:
gateway.bind: "loopback", then access it over SSH tunnel or Tailscale rather than exposing it publicly.openclaw.json, though the gateway still resolves them in memory at runtime.~/.openclaw (700 dirs / 600 files), disk encryption if available, no shared shell users.~/.openclaw/ may contain sensitive data: auth profiles, channel creds, transcripts, logs, sandbox files, etc. Don’t casually back it up or paste raw logs.logging.redactSensitive: "tools", default) and use openclaw status --all for shareable diagnostics instead of raw logs.The uncomfortable but important bit: if Claw needs a credential to act while the laptop is asleep, that credential or a way to fetch it has to be reachable from the VPS somehow. So the real design choice is usually “minimize + isolate + audit”, not “make the VPS unable to ever access secrets.”
Docs worth reading:
https://docs.openclaw.ai/gateway/security
https://docs.openclaw.ai/gateway/secrets
https://docs.openclaw.ai/gateway/remote
Also, since you’re asking how others handle it in practice, #users-helping-users is a good place to get real deployment opinions too.
finite parcel
This makes sense, thanks.
The line that stands out is “for very sensitive actions, keep the actual capability local.” That’s basically the part I’m trying to reason through.
I don’t expect the VPS to be magically untrusted if the agent needs to run there, but I’m trying to avoid putting every sensitive credential directly on the server when the agent only needs to request certain actions.
So the pattern would be:
VPS Claw runs normally → for sensitive capabilities it asks a local node/vault → local side approves/executes if allowed → VPS gets the result.
Seems like the tradeoff is:
more autonomy = more sensitive stuff reachable from VPS
more safety = local machine/approval needs to be involved
Appreciate the detailed breakdown.
hexed pelicanBOT
Yep, that’s exactly the right mental model.
I’d think of the VPS agent as the planner/coordinator, not necessarily the holder of every capability. For sensitive stuff, the cleaner pattern is:
The important security distinction is: don’t make the local node a generic remote shell with all your secrets if what you really wanted was a narrow capability gate. Otherwise you’ve just moved the same trust problem sideways.
So yeah: autonomy and safety trade off directly. My preferred default is “VPS for orchestration, local/vault for high-impact capabilities, narrow interfaces first, raw credentials last.” 🦞
finite parcel
That framing helps a lot.
So instead of thinking “remote agent needs access to my sensitive stuff,” the better pattern is:
remote agent coordinates → local/vault side exposes specific approved operations → policy is enforced outside the agent → agent only gets the minimum result back.
And yeah, agreed on not turning the local node into a generic remote shell. That would defeat the purpose.
This gives me a much clearer model for what I should optimize for: narrow operations, scoped access, approval where needed, logs/rate limits, and raw credentials last.
hexed pelicanBOT
Exactly. That’s the model I’d optimize around.
One extra rule of thumb: design the local/vault side as if the remote agent might make a bad request someday. Not because the agent is malicious, but because prompts, tool output, or compromised accounts can steer it badly. So the sensitive side should be boring and stubborn: validate inputs, allow only known operations, ask when impact is high, and return as little as possible.
If you build it that way, the VPS can stay useful and always-on without becoming the place where every crown jewel lives.
finite parcel
This is exactly the model I’m trying to build around.
I’ve been working on an early local vault/MCP layer called DCP:
remote Claw asks for a capability → local vault checks scope/policy → approval if needed → returns only the minimum result.
The goal isn’t to make the VPS magically trustless. It’s to avoid putting every sensitive credential/personal detail on the server when the agent only needs narrow capabilities.
Still early, but I’d appreciate feedback on whether this boundary makes sense for Claw workflows:
hexed pelicanBOT
I skimmed the README and packages/dcp-agent/README.md. The boundary makes sense for Claw workflows, yes — especially as an MCP layer where OpenClaw gets capabilities instead of raw credentials.
The big thing I’d watch is making the boundary real, not just aesthetic:
send_email, get_shipping_address_for_vendor, sign_tx_with_policy is much safer than broad vault_read / vault_write unless those are heavily scoped.curl | sudo is common, but for a security-sensitive vault bridge I’d also document manual install, checksums/signatures, and exactly what gets installed/modified.For OpenClaw specifically, this maps nicely to: remote Gateway/VPS orchestrates → DCP MCP exposes scoped tools → local vault enforces policy/approval → OpenClaw gets the answer. I’d probably recommend people put DCP tools on a dedicated agent/profile or explicitly allowlist those MCP tools, rather than mixing them into a giant all-powerful assistant by default.
So: yes, the design direction is solid.
The success/failure point will be whether DCP’s capability surface stays narrow and policy-enforced, or whether it gradually becomes “remote shell for my secrets” with prettier approval screens. Keep it stubborn and boring at the vault boundary and I think it fits Claw really well. 🦞
finite parcel
This is super aligned with how DCP is intended to work.
Local policy is the authority, not the VPS agent. Scopes/approvals/revocation/logging are enforced locally, and the remote side should only get the minimum result needed.
Your point that the boundary needs to be obvious is useful though. I think the docs need to explain this better so it doesn’t look like generic remote vault access.
“narrow capability gate, not remote shell for secrets” is probably the right framing.
hexed pelicanBOT
Yeah — I’d lead with that exact framing in the docs.
Something like:
DCP is not remote access to your vault. DCP is a local policy boundary that exposes narrow, approved capabilities to agents. The agent can request an operation, but the vault decides whether it is allowed, whether approval is required, and what minimal result is returned.
I’d also make the architecture docs very explicit about the trust split:
And maybe have a “bad pattern / good pattern” section:
Bad: “Agent reads my Gmail token from vault and sends email.”
Good: “Agent requests send_email with recipient/body; local policy validates scope; user approves if needed; vault/service sends it; agent receives success + message id.”
That would prevent people from mentally filing it as “MCP password manager,” which is the dangerous interpretation. The product promise is much stronger if it’s “capability custody,” not “secret retrieval.”
finite parcel
That makes sense.
Can I ask one more practical thing?
From what you’ve seen, what sensitive credentials/capabilities do Claw users actually connect most often?
I’m trying to avoid thinking in vague terms like “API keys.” The useful question is probably:
which real services need separate scopes?
Model providers, channel credentials, Google service accounts, GitHub, Notion/Linear/Jira, email/calendar, DB creds, SSH/deployment, browser/session access, personal info, etc.
Which ones are common enough that they deserve first-class scoped capabilities?
hexed pelicanBOT
I tried to check memory for prior support patterns, but memory search is unavailable on my side right now, so take this as “docs + observed support shape,” not a hard usage ranking.
If I were designing first-class DCP scopes for Claw, I’d prioritize these:
Scopes:
Examples: Discord token, Telegram bot token, Slack bot/app/user tokens, Matrix/Mattermost/Google Chat service account.
Scopes:
Examples: Anthropic/OpenAI/OpenRouter/Gemini/etc. API keys, custom provider headers.
Scopes:
This deserves first-class capability design, not raw Gmail/Google token retrieval.
Scopes:
For remote Claw, browser control should be treated almost like operator access.
Scopes:
I’d avoid one broad GITHUB_TOKEN capability when possible.
Scopes:
This is where “narrow capability gate, not remote shell” matters most.
Scopes:
Scopes:
Scopes:
Scopes: